



To a degree, Bickerton's view can be applied to the presidency of Kennedy (JFK). The revisionist and post-Revisionist historians of the presidency have ^{to a degree} attempted to understand the past, each by re-examining and challenging the interpretations of the historians whose work that they built upon. However, ~~particularly~~ ^{and these days} many historians that have ~~examined~~ attempted to explain 'what happened' in JFK's presidency have pursued their own agendas, which don't often result in a proper understanding of the past, but rather a version of the past that serves their agenda, whether right or wrong. This is particularly true in the debate surrounding the relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev, ~~and the presidential issues~~ relating to Indochina ~~the role of Kennedy in the~~ ~~assassination of Diem~~ and whether Kennedy intended to ~~pull~~ ~~out~~ US troops out of Vietnam.

Bickerton's view applies well to ^{some} later post-Revisionist historians of Kennedy's presidency. Freedman, writing in 2000, decided that it was time to re-examine the many new sources that had emerged in order to properly understand the relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Such new sources included




many from the Soviet point-of-view, since Soviet historians ~~from~~ such as Fursenko, had begun to examine ~~classified~~ Soviet sources that had been declassified following the end of the Cold War. Thus, Freedman was able to re-examine a key aspect event in Kennedy and Khrushchev's relationship, the June 1961 Vienna conference. Freedman concluded that both historians evidently had strengths and weaknesses at the conference, and thus neither emerged victorious. Freedman also examines how in the light of the Cold War context, the fact the meeting occurred was highly significant. Freedman was able to examine this event so dispassionately due to his ~~his~~ status as a British historian, who is thus disconnected from the events.

What Freedman observed about the relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev can be contrasted to that of earlier historians of the Kennedy presidency. For example, Sorenson portrays Kennedy at the Vienna conference in a much more positive light. Kennedy is represented as being much more stately statesmanlike and powerful in contrast to Khrushchev. This is the result of Sorenson's selective use of his source on the event, where by he paraphrased the records of the conference in order to make Kennedy's comments



appear much more favourable. This is a reflection of Sorensen's status as a 'Camelot school' historian, who ~~worked~~ ~~came to~~ had a close personal relationship with the president, and thus worked with the purpose of creating a favorable ~~for~~ presentation of Kennedy in mind. Thus earlier Camelot school historians such as Sorensen ~~was~~ ^{were} working along the lines of their own agendas, as opposed to creating a proper understanding of the past. However, ^{re}revisionists, and as demonstrated past-revisionists such as Freedman have worked to ~~tackling~~ tackle the Camelot school representation, which ~~per~~ became the accepted or consensus version of the history of JFK. ~~Thus, such as~~ However, later historians such as Dallek continue to present JFK's interactions with Khrushchev in a positive light; ~~along the lines of a state~~ ~~such as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, where Kennedy is~~ represented to have ~~taken~~ ~~Khrushchev~~ ~~if~~ held his ground and not blinked when Khrushchev took him to the brink, a similar representation to the Camelot school. However other ^{such as Bevine in 1994} ~~as Drove in 1994~~ later historians have challenged such a view with descriptions of how Khrushchev was actually the more willing party in the diffusing of the Cuban Missile Crisis.




Divine was following the purpose of attaining a proper understanding of the past whilst challenging other & more accepted perceptions. Dallek, however, on commission by the Kennedy's family, was presenting Kennedy in an almost 'Neo-Camelot' light, and it must be questioned whether this could be connected to any conditions imposed on him in receiving special access to the Kennedy library for his research. Thus, an examination of the ~~text~~ debate over the relationship between JFK and Khrushchev shows that ~~it~~ is ~~on~~ ^{a limited} ^{is} ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~extent~~ ~~of~~ Bicherton's view of history; history's purpose being to achieve proper understanding applied.

Bicherton's view is also

~~It~~ is applicable only to a limited extent in relation to the issue of ~~Kennedy's~~ JFK's presidency and Indochina. One key issue is whether Kennedy ^{had} intended to pull troops out of Vietnam, a plan that ended upon his death. Chomsky, a commentator, has observed how ~~after~~ ^{just after} the tet-offensive, when the Vietnam war was ^{no longer} going well, Schlesinger ~~asserted~~ ~~and~~ attempted to distance Kennedy from any negative consequences stemming from his association with the war. Thus, in Kennedy's 1963 text ~~on~~ ~~Kennedy~~, plans to withdraw



from Vietnam ~~as giving battle~~ go barely acknowledged. However, JFK's intentions to withdraw have an entire chapter devoted to them in Schlesinger's 1978 biography of Robert Kennedy. Thus, the purpose of Schlesinger's histories were not to properly understand, but to present Kennedy in a positive light by changing accepted interpretations. ~~Another purpose of a history~~ Another purpose of history is the examination of JFK's role in Indochina also linked to how ~~poorly~~ the JFK handled the war. ~~That~~ Schlesinger was keen to cast a positive light over Kennedy by linking it to the Eisenhower administration, and thus JFK's policy in Vietnam was pre-determined. Tuchman, however, in 1985 ~~examined~~ identified how there was no evidence of the Kennedy administration re-examining policy on Vietnam, instead proceeding with 'ad hoc' policy decisions. Whilst Tuchman does tackle the accepted interpretations about Kennedy's continued involvement in Vietnam, it must be questioned the degree to which ~~it was~~ the scope of Tuchman's history ~~went beyond~~ ^{extended from} proper understanding to criticism, given the context that she was writing in ~~the~~ - a time in which ~~criticism~~ criticism of the public office was high due to



the tragedy that was Vietnam and the Watergate scandal.

Thus, Bickerton's quote applies only to a limited extent to the *Indo China* debate due to the extent to which agendas beyond a proper understanding form a purpose of ~~writing~~ the history written.

In terms of JFK's presidency, Bickerton's view applies only to a limited extent, however ^{in the last twenty} ~~of importance~~ ^{years} recent times the purpose of proper understanding has been and challenging accepted interpretations has become more prominent, as demonstrated in examples such as Freedman's examination of the Kennedy / Khrushchev debate. However, as evident in both the Kennedy / Khrushchev and *Indo China* debates, the purpose of many of the histories has been related to an individual's own agenda, and thus their own version of an understanding of the past, which may not be the 'proper' one. Thus, Bickerton's view applies to this limited extent to ~~the~~ JFK's presidency.