



BOARD OF STUDIES
NEW SOUTH WALES

2001

**HIGHER SCHOOL CERTIFICATE
EXAMINATION**

Modern History

Source Booklet

Instructions

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Source A

A Trench Scene



Source B

Extract from the *First World War* by John Keegan, published 1998

The tanks, massed on a front of 10 000 yards, were to advance in dense formation, with the infantry following close behind to take prisoners, capture guns and consolidate the ground conquered. The way into the enemy positions would be secured by the tanks crushing lanes through the wire—in the Hindenburg position at Cambrai several hundred yards deep—while the tanks would find a way across the trenches by dropping into them ‘fascines’—bundles of brushwood—as bridges. There were three successive German lines, 7000 yards—nearly four miles—deep, and it was intended to break through all in a single bound on the first day.

Because the Cambrai front had long been quiet, it was garrisoned by only two divisions, the 20th Landwehr and the 54th Reserve, supported by no more than 150 guns . . . The 54th Reserve . . . was commanded by General Von Walter . . . who had, unusually among German soldiers, taken account of the tanks’ potentiality [potential] and trained his gunners to engage moving targets from protected positions.

Walter’s keen interest in tank operations—at a time when the German army had no tanks—was to be of the greatest influence on the outcome of the battle. So, too, was the failure of comprehension of the tank’s potential on the part of [British] General G. M. Harper, commanding the 51st Highland Division, the infantry formation at the centre of the front of attack. Harper, brave but conventional, did not like tanks but loved his Highland soldiers. He had formed the view that tanks would attract German artillery fire on to his infantry and so, instead of insisting that they follow closely, ordered them to keep 150–200 yards behind. The resulting separation was to spell doom to the British attack at the now critical moment of the battle.

Source C

Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States, 8 January 1918

We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme [Wilson's 14 points] that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world,—the new world in which we now live,—instead of a place of mastery.

Source D

From a note by the German government to the Allies, 22 June 1919

. . . The government of the German republic is committed to fulfilling the peace conditions imposed on Germany. It would like . . . to counter at the outset any accusation of untruthfulness which could be made against Germany now or later. The conditions imposed exceed the limits that Germany can in fact achieve. The government of the German republic therefore feels obliged to declare that it is expressing all reservations and rejects any responsibility for the consequences which could be imposed on Germany when the unworkability of the conditions, even with the most extreme straining of German capabilities, becomes apparent, as it must. Germany further places the greatest emphasis on the declaration that it cannot accept Article 231 of the peace treaty which demands of Germany that it admits to being the sole instigator of the war and that its signature does not cover it.

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